#ejabberd developer. Interested in #xmpp, functional programming, protocol design and implementation of Internet services. And #communism. And #soccer.
#ejabberd developer. Interested in #xmpp, functional programming, protocol design and implementation of Internet services. And #communism. And #soccer.
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#ejabberd developer. Interested in #xmpp, functional programming, protocol design and implementation of Internet services. And #communism. And #soccer.
#ejabberd developer. Interested in #xmpp, functional programming, protocol design and implementation of Internet services. And #communism. And #soccer.
@Monal@fosstodon.org Yes.
I think the main scenario that certificate authentication protects against but Dialback does not looks like this:
- Alice exchanges messages with a remote contact, Bob.
- Those messages aren't E2E-encrypted/-verified.
- The attacker cannot MitM Alice's c2s connection.
- The attacker cannot MitM Bob's c2s connection.
- The attacker has no access to the remote server's certificate/key.
- DNSSEC is not deployed for the relevant domain(s).
- The attacker cannot MitM the (multi-perspective) DNS traffic used for issuing a new certificate.
- But the attacker can MitM the DNS traffic used for Dialback.
#ejabberd developer. Interested in #xmpp, functional programming, protocol design and implementation of Internet services. And #communism. And #soccer.
#ejabberd developer. Interested in #xmpp, functional programming, protocol design and implementation of Internet services. And #communism. And #soccer.
In case you're using the official ejabberd packages on Debian stable: They're affected by a recent CA policy change (e.g., Let's Encrypt), causing ejabberd to reject newly issued certificates and thereby breaking federation with some remote servers. Deploy this update to fix the issue:
https://bugs.debian.org/cgi-bin/bugreport.cgi?bug=1128568#23
You may also want to consider enabling mod_s2s_dialback to deal with remote servers that haven't been updated yet.