Internet infrastructure security and performance: #IPv6, #BGP, #DNS, #DDoS.
Pawel Foremski
@pjf@infosec.exchange
infosec.exchange
bgpipe v0.22 is out! 🚀
New: MRT table dump support. A full RIB snapshot from RouteViews or RIPE RIS now streams as BGP updates, each tagged with the peer it came from.
Which means every stage you already use just works on them:
bgpipe --rpki -- read rib.bz2 -- rov -- grep 'tag[rov/status] == INVALID'
That is RPKI validation of an entire routing table. 4.1M routes in 7s, validated in 8s.
https://bgpipe.org
#BGP #RPKI #networking
John Kristoff
@jtk@infosec.exchange
UIC PhD candidate | Dataplane.org | Bit mechanic #BGP #DNS and #infosec #Blues / #Chicago / #tfr / #fedi22 Views are my own.
infosec.exchange
Weekend Reads
- Inside an Internet shutdown https://labs.ripe.net/author/mdkamruzzaman-khan-2/inside-a-shutdown-bgp-evidence-from-an-operator-who-was-there/
- Inferring shared IP addresses https://burdantes.github.io/assets/pdf/multi_user_ip-sigcomm.pdf
- BGP origin attribute manipulation https://blog.cloudflare.com/bgp-origin-attribute/
- IP reassembly congestion DoS attacks https://cispa.saarland/group/rossow/papers/FragJam-usenix2026.pdf
- Operators on academic BGP security solutions https://pure.mpg.de/rest/items/item_3719779_1/component/file_3719780/content
Stéphane Bortzmeyer
@bortzmeyer@mastodon.gougere.fr
Je parle surtout d'informatique / I talk mostly about computing.
mastodon.gougere.fr
#BGP #RPKI
"With eight Firehol level 1 blocklist matches out of only 79 prefixes, repo.rpki.space stands out immediately. Inspection of BGP Tools DNS records for this server reveals a high density of mailing domains, strongly suggesting that spam mailing infrastructure is hosted across the prefixes in question. "
An interesting survey of "small" RPKI servers. https://labs.ripe.net/author/ties-dirksen/whos-running-all-those-tiny-rpki-servers/
John Kristoff
@jtk@infosec.exchange
UIC PhD candidate | Dataplane.org | Bit mechanic #BGP #DNS and #infosec #Blues / #Chicago / #tfr / #fedi22 Views are my own.
infosec.exchange
Weekend Reads
- PQC for the RPKI https://labs.ripe.net/author/dirk/pqc-for-the-rpki/
- Big tech in Taiwan https://cset.georgetown.edu/publication/big-tech-in-taiwan/
- China's Internet Control https://locknet.chinafile.com/the-locknet/intro/
- Smartwatch security and privacy https://arxiv.org/abs/2507.07210
- App-layer desync attack TLS attack https://opossum-attack.com
Bryton Herdes
@next_hopself@mastodon.social
Father of 2 | Principal Network Troublemaker at Cloudflare | JNCIE-SP #3023 | Views are my own
mastodon.social
ASPA object typo?
Saw this in a path w/ @mingwei@infosec.exchange
🇨🇭AS8298 ↔️ 🇨🇭AS58299 ↔️ 🇺🇸AS13335
AS relationship is inferred as peer-peer between 8298 and 58299.
ASPA object for AS8298 defines AS52899 as a provider, thinking that's meant to be AS58299 🙂
https://radar.cloudflare.com/routing/rpki/as8298#rpki-aspa-providers
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