Breaker of software, investigator of incidents | GSE #150 | Faculty at IANS Research | Stuff: jake at malwarejake dot com | He/him
Breaker of software, investigator of incidents | GSE #150 | Faculty at IANS Research | Stuff: jake at malwarejake dot com | He/him
Posts
Breaker of software, investigator of incidents | GSE #150 | Faculty at IANS Research | Stuff: jake at malwarejake dot com | He/him
Breaker of software, investigator of incidents | GSE #150 | Faculty at IANS Research | Stuff: jake at malwarejake dot com | He/him
Breaker of software, investigator of incidents | GSE #150 | Faculty at IANS Research | Stuff: jake at malwarejake dot com | He/him
Breaker of software, investigator of incidents | GSE #150 | Faculty at IANS Research | Stuff: jake at malwarejake dot com | He/him
When discussing AI safety, it's critical to understand:
- Models can only act on the world when we give them a path with which to do so
- Everyone understands prompts aren't guardrails
- Anyone discussing a real-world safety issue must admit it flowed from a lack of their own technical controls
Breaker of software, investigator of incidents | GSE #150 | Faculty at IANS Research | Stuff: jake at malwarejake dot com | He/him
Breaker of software, investigator of incidents | GSE #150 | Faculty at IANS Research | Stuff: jake at malwarejake dot com | He/him
Breaker of software, investigator of incidents | GSE #150 | Faculty at IANS Research | Stuff: jake at malwarejake dot com | He/him
Breaker of software, investigator of incidents | GSE #150 | Faculty at IANS Research | Stuff: jake at malwarejake dot com | He/him
Breaker of software, investigator of incidents | GSE #150 | Faculty at IANS Research | Stuff: jake at malwarejake dot com | He/him
Breaker of software, investigator of incidents | GSE #150 | Faculty at IANS Research | Stuff: jake at malwarejake dot com | He/him
Breaker of software, investigator of incidents | GSE #150 | Faculty at IANS Research | Stuff: jake at malwarejake dot com | He/him
Breaker of software, investigator of incidents | GSE #150 | Faculty at IANS Research | Stuff: jake at malwarejake dot com | He/him
Breaker of software, investigator of incidents | GSE #150 | Faculty at IANS Research | Stuff: jake at malwarejake dot com | He/him
Breaker of software, investigator of incidents | GSE #150 | Faculty at IANS Research | Stuff: jake at malwarejake dot com | He/him
Breaker of software, investigator of incidents | GSE #150 | Faculty at IANS Research | Stuff: jake at malwarejake dot com | He/him
Breaker of software, investigator of incidents | GSE #150 | Faculty at IANS Research | Stuff: jake at malwarejake dot com | He/him
Breaker of software, investigator of incidents | GSE #150 | Faculty at IANS Research | Stuff: jake at malwarejake dot com | He/him
Most clients struggling with AI governance are struggling because they haven't fully defined their enterprise data governance requirements.
You can't code "people will use their judgment" into coherent AI governance, as much as you might want to.
Breaker of software, investigator of incidents | GSE #150 | Faculty at IANS Research | Stuff: jake at malwarejake dot com | He/him
When life hands you lemons, squeeze lemon juice in the eyes of your enemies.
Breaker of software, investigator of incidents | GSE #150 | Faculty at IANS Research | Stuff: jake at malwarejake dot com | He/him
It is frankly infuriating that our alcoholic SECDEF couldn't plan to adequately support our service members and families evacuated due to a war of choice and left that work to community groups instead.
https://www.npr.org/2026/04/03/nx-s1-5770491/evacuation-bahrain-norfolk-troops
Breaker of software, investigator of incidents | GSE #150 | Faculty at IANS Research | Stuff: jake at malwarejake dot com | He/him
Breaker of software, investigator of incidents | GSE #150 | Faculty at IANS Research | Stuff: jake at malwarejake dot com | He/him
Looks like doggo is getting ready to take flight :)
Breaker of software, investigator of incidents | GSE #150 | Faculty at IANS Research | Stuff: jake at malwarejake dot com | He/him
Not a week passes that I don't find more evidence that Copilot was a rush job from Microsoft and has serious limitations for enterprises.
https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/purview/dlp-microsoft365-copilot-location-learn-about
Breaker of software, investigator of incidents | GSE #150 | Faculty at IANS Research | Stuff: jake at malwarejake dot com | He/him
I couldn't get rid of this pop-out without submitting an email, so I did the only responsible thing I could think of...
Breaker of software, investigator of incidents | GSE #150 | Faculty at IANS Research | Stuff: jake at malwarejake dot com | He/him
That Iranian Navy ship we torpedoed had no ammunition on board because that was a requirement to participate in the MILAN 2026 exercise (organized by the Indian Navy).
The US Navy knew this because IT ALSO PARTICIPATED IN THE EXERCISE. What a national embarrassment.
https://newrepublic.com/post/207429/us-attack-iran-naval-ship
Breaker of software, investigator of incidents | GSE #150 | Faculty at IANS Research | Stuff: jake at malwarejake dot com | He/him
RE: @malwarejake@infosec.exchange
It's confirmed that Khamenei is dead. Intentionally killing a country's sitting leader, especially the religious leader in a theocracy, is NOT how you go about regime change.
This will NOT end well.
https://www.reuters.com/world/iran-crisis-live-explosions-tehran-israel-announces-strike-2026-02-28/
Breaker of software, investigator of incidents | GSE #150 | Faculty at IANS Research | Stuff: jake at malwarejake dot com | He/him
Given reports that Israeli intelligence assesses Khamenei was killed, I assess with high (extreme) confidence that cyber was used to:
1. Confirm his location and direct the attacks.
2. Using collection on Iranian gov officials (e.g., email) reactions of the strike.
Breaker of software, investigator of incidents | GSE #150 | Faculty at IANS Research | Stuff: jake at malwarejake dot com | He/him
Iran is a theocracy. It is likely to stay a theocracy. There is no viable replacement for Khamenei that is friendly to the US/Israel.
Killing Khamenei takes us from bad to likely worse. The Iranian people don't want this and that's critical for regime change.
https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/prior-iran-attacks-cia-assessed-khamenei-would-be-replaced-by-hardline-irgc-2026-02-28/
Breaker of software, investigator of incidents | GSE #150 | Faculty at IANS Research | Stuff: jake at malwarejake dot com | He/him
@krypt3ia@infosec.exchange Yes - that and IRGC QF.
Breaker of software, investigator of incidents | GSE #150 | Faculty at IANS Research | Stuff: jake at malwarejake dot com | He/him
I've already had questions from a FinServ client about Iran replicating Operation Ababil (2012-2013 DDoS targeting FS orgs).
My assessment is that is not likely to happen. Iran has limited capacity for cyberattacks and given the current situation, they have MUCH higher priorities for cyberattacks. Realistically, they are FAR more likely to use their limited cyber resources for intelligence collection instead of destructive attacks that would have limited impacts. They are likely unable to perform another Shamoon-style attack either, since that requires significant prepositioning. In any case, it's unlikely they have enough prepositioning in US orgs (especially FS) to create that type of impact.
One other note, is that FS orgs are in a much different position today to deal with any DDoS attacks that Iranian-linked threat actors might attempt. Operation Ababil was a wakeup call for the whole industry and they've definitely become more resilient to DDoS in the last decade+ since.
Breaker of software, investigator of incidents | GSE #150 | Faculty at IANS Research | Stuff: jake at malwarejake dot com | He/him
The administration is getting US service members killed over the fucking Epstein files. I am livid. I hope to live to see Hegseth and every other member of the administration enabling this hanging on a wall.
This is so triggering for my PTSD. Fuck man. This is not okay. I am not okay.
Breaker of software, investigator of incidents | GSE #150 | Faculty at IANS Research | Stuff: jake at malwarejake dot com | He/him
Cymbalta is a wonder drug.
I am still in pain and still have PTSD symptoms, but I am legit the happiest I've been in as long as I can remember.
Breaker of software, investigator of incidents | GSE #150 | Faculty at IANS Research | Stuff: jake at malwarejake dot com | He/him
I may be in full mid life crisis mode. But on the plus side, I just got this glorious hat.
Breaker of software, investigator of incidents | GSE #150 | Faculty at IANS Research | Stuff: jake at malwarejake dot com | He/him
Breaker of software, investigator of incidents | GSE #150 | Faculty at IANS Research | Stuff: jake at malwarejake dot com | He/him
Only those wanting to scam consumers are threatened by the existence of the CFPB.
I said what I said.