Essence of the
#Zelensky #Fedorov conflict in
#Ukraine as captured by
#Poland military analytic Marcin Ogdowski:
Reports of the destruction of Russian rear bases, the stalemate on the front line, Kyiv’s diplomatic offensive (…) is like a cocoon, creating the illusion of victory, giving the impression that the worst is already behind us, that Russia is on its knees, and that the war will end any moment now. All we need to do is hold out for a few more months and deal the Russians a few more painful blows.
From this perspective, there is no mention of the costs to Ukraine – as if this were an irrelevant factor. As if the condition of the Ukrainian state and society remained a constant – impervious and resilient to Russian attacks.
Meanwhile, Ukraine is bleeding to death… The army is suffering very heavy losses, recruitment and mobilisation efforts are faltering, and the economy – despite innovations in the defence sector – remains inefficient, dependent on a Western lifeline.
A country in such a state should not be engaging in a war of attrition. For whilst the enemy is also taking a beating, it still has more to give; Ukraine cannot overcome this asymmetry through a traditional exchange of blows. Overcoming Russia’s advantages must take the form of revolutionary solutions – organising the battlefield in such a way that the Russians do not suffer greater losses (which is not difficult), but that their losses are drastically higher – several times, and ultimately more than a dozen times, as many as Ukraine’s. This lethal multiplier effect holds the key to victory, understood as forcing the Russians to end the war.
If Ukraine kills and wounds 35–40,000 Russians a month, whilst losing 15–20,000 of its own soldiers, it will not get very far. Even in a situation where the casualty profile – the ratio of non-returnable to returnable casualties – is more favourable to Kyiv (as is currently the case and has been for most of the war). Quite simply, Ukraine has four times fewer of these people (or rather five times, taking into account the actual manpower available to the authorities in Kyiv).
The former Ukrainian Defence Minister, Mykhailo Fedorov, understood this stark arithmetic of war very well. Hence his ideas on the use of drones and robotics, i.e. greater combat effectiveness. Above all, however, he focused on the reorganisation of the army’s industry and logistics – digitising them wherever possible. The aim was to eliminate the ‘human factor’, which is burdened by incompetence, excessive decision-making or a lack thereof, the temptation to engage in corruption, and other weaknesses.
But Fedorov is no longer head of the Ministry of Defence – that was the decision taken by President Zelenskyy. Consequently, the centre of gravity in ‘battlefield design’ is once again shifting towards those associated with the Ukrainian High Command and its head, General Oleksandr Syrskyi. And he “fights in the Russian style” – though I realise this is a simplification – embracing the logic of a war of attrition. His successes in stabilising the front always entail huge losses for the Ukrainian Armed Forces. Syrskyi’s manoeuvres typically lack finesse, innovation, and operational and tactical dexterity. There is a great deal of Soviet art of war, with its fixation on ‘meat-grinder assaults’. And the conviction that brutality – including towards one’s own soldiers – will eventually break the enemy.
https://bezkamuflazu.pl/ukraina-sie-wykrwawia/
