#detectionengineering

4 posts · Last used 9d

Back to Timeline
Wes Lambert @weslambert@infosec.exchange · Jul 16, 2026
📢 Come join us in Atlanta, GA November 13-14 at Monday Night Brewing - The Grove, for #DEATHCon 2026 on-site! 📢 We'll have a ton of excellent workshops and interesting environments to explore, focusing on #threathunting and #detectionengineering! 🔍 🏹 Meet fellow practitioners, learn something new, and enjoy some great food and beverages in a relaxed, friendly setting! 🤝 🥪 https://www.simpletix.com/e/deathcon-atlanta-2026-tickets-280161
0
0
1
hasamba @hasamba@infosec.exchange · Jul 03, 2026

🛠️ Tool: SigmaLineage MCP

Sigma hits without context are noise. SigmaLineage MCP is a FastMCP server that wraps three capabilities into a single AI-callable interface, designed to solve the false-positive problem that plagues detection engineering.

What it does

  1. Sigma Hunt (run_sigma) — runs Chainsaw against an EVTX folder with the full SigmaHQ rule set.
  2. Process Lineage Tracing (run_sigma_lineage) — for every Sigma hit, automatically traces the parent→child execution tree up to 5+ generations, building a full kill-chain view.
  3. Rarity Baseline Engine (rare_events_baseline) — statistically surfaces anomalous process-to-port connections, suspicious user-log event combinations, and unusual URL lookups that don't fit the baseline.

The false positive problem

regsvr32.exe spawning a child process matches 40 Sigma rules and also matches every legitimate COM registration. wmic.exe executing a command could be lateral movement or your asset management tool. cmd.exe spawned by mmc.exe looks terrifying until you realize it is normal DCOM-based remote management. The alert alone tells you nothing. The parent chain tells you everything.

How lineage tracing works

SigmaLineage uses the Rust-backed evtx Python parser to build an in-memory process graph from Sysmon Event ID 1 (process creation) and Security Event ID 4688 in your EVTX corpus. It resolves ancestry using ProcessGuid strings for Sysmon events, and uses a PID + timestamp closest-fit algorithm for Security events that lack GUIDs. The result: for every Sigma hit, you get the full execution tree rendered in markdown.

Real example from EVTX-Attack-Samples — impacket wmiexec:

[WmiPrvSE.exe (PID: 836)] └─ [cmd.exe (PID: 2828)] (HIT) cmd.exe /Q /c whoami /all 1> \127.0.0.1\ADMIN$__1556656369.7 2>&1 └─ [whoami.exe (PID: 3328)] (HIT) whoami /all

One look and you know: cmd.exe spawned by WmiPrvSE.exe, writing output to the ADMIN$ share via a UNC path. Textbook WMI exec pattern. Not a false positive.

Compare to a surface-identical alert where lineage shows [services.exe] → [PSEXESVC.exe]. Same alert, different root cause (PsExec), instantly disambiguated.

The rarity engine solves anomaly discovery rather than false positive reduction. It statistically surfaces unusual process-to-port connections, suspicious user-log event combinations, and URL lookups without needing a predefined rule.

Plug into any MCP-compatible AI client (Cursor, Claude Desktop, Antigravity, OpenCode). Describe what you want to investigate in plain English, get structured analysis back.

Note: haven't tested personally.

🔹 SigmaLineage #tool #DetectionEngineering #Sigma #MCP

🔗 Source: https://mohitdabas.in/blog/sigmalineage-mcp-evtx-hunting-lineage-first-triage/

0
0
0
Saltmyhash @saltmyhash@infosec.exchange · Jul 01, 2026
Friendly reminder that the first round of DEATHCon tickets go on sale July 7th. I recommend setting a reminder and logging on earlier in the day (like, early morning) to purchase as they will sell out quick. DEATHCon is easily the best bang for your conference buck when it comes to the amount of presentations and available logs to cut your teeth on detection engineering and threat hunting. https://deathcon.io/tickets.html #deathcon #threathunting #detectionengineering #conference
0
0
0
Saltmyhash @saltmyhash@infosec.exchange · Jun 27, 2026
Network defenders should take a look at and hunt for Overlord RAT, a publicly-available and open-source Go-based RAT. Proofpoint recently published a blog post highlighting its adoption by UNK_DeadDrop, a DPRK-nexus threat group which appears to have used a lightly modified version but can still be detected via Shodan, Censys, or FOFA queries. Proofpoint notes minor operational overlaps with Contagious Interview, but UNK_DeadDrop appears to prefer Overlord while Contagious Interview sticks with OtterCookie/InvisibleFerret. Regardless, extraction of TTPs is super easy when the source code is available and great for folks who want an introduction into detection engineering and/or threat hunting. For example, Overlord RAT ships with default self-signed certificates/port configurations. While advanced adversaries will obviously alter these settings, many groups won’t, including UNK_DeadDrop. This makes developing a baseline detection within Censys/Shodan/FOFA trivial for monitoring. The Censys query in the screenshot is rudimentary, but you get the idea. Start with low-hanging fruit and tune your queries to hunt for advanced adversaries who might be using more bespoke Overlord configurations. Once found, ingest and retro-hunt the IOCs in your environment. Overlord clients will establish C2 communications with these servers. https://www.proofpoint.com/us/blog/threat-insight/dont-fear-repo-unkdeaddrop-phishing-campaign-targets-developers-steal https://github.com/vxaboveground/Overlord #overlord #unk_deaddrop #RAT #detectionengineering #threathunting #cti #threatintel
0
0
0

You've seen all posts