@DaveMWilburn@infosec.exchange
Post #4145053
2026-07-27 19:29 UTC
@mttaggart@infosec.exchange
So, correct me if I'm wrong, but Hugging Face ran into a brick wall early in their incident response process when they were blocked by one or more models from analyzing security log data due to guardrails. Their work around was to use a Chinese-sourced open weight model with fewer guardrail restrictions. Part of OpenAI's response to this debacle was to offer to enroll Hugging Face into their trusted access program, which is clearly marketed as providing at least infosec functionality, implied to include some functionality that Hugging Face struggled to access past guardrails. Some invite-only portion of OpenAI's trusted access program includes further loosening of guardrails to allow even greater use in the infosec domain, although it's not clear to me that Hugging Face is approved for that specifically.
For me, the fundamental issue is that the set of potential GenAI model users with legitimate requirements for so-called dual-use functionality (e.g., common infosec use cases) is so large as to be unmanageable at scale.
Replies (1)
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@mttaggart@infosec.exchange 2026-07-27 20:22
@DaveMWilburn@infosec.exchange You are correct on all the facts of the event as stated. Your contention then is that all such verification or trust programs are impossible to maintain. I guess I just don't agree? Like if your issue is that governments will abuse the models, for sure that's going to happen. A different issue, imo, than vetting/access control. Your core contention seems to be that these gigantic companies can't scale up a reasonable vetting process. I see no structural reason why that's true. I see lots of reasons why these unserious people will fail to do so, however.