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Christoph Stoettner @stoeps@infosec.exchange · Jul 31, 2026
New post: Open Tabs CW31/2026 A new Gnome extension, a word worm (I thought we got over Office worms ages ago) and an OpenAI parrot attacked Hugging Face. Interesting week and some stuff to read. Have fun. https://stoeps.de/posts/2026/open-tabs-cw31/ Reply to this toot to leave a comment - replies will appear below the article automatically. #ai #cw31_2026 #extension #gnome #m365 #openai #prompt_injection #tiu #word #worm
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hasamba @hasamba@infosec.exchange · Jul 24, 2026

🎯 Threat Intelligence

Device code flow phishing continues to surface as an initial access technique in M365 and BEC incident response engagements handled by TrustedSec. The technique bypasses both user suspicion and several Conditional Access patterns organizations depend on.

Legitimate Device Code Flow

The OAuth 2.0 device authorization grant (RFC 8628) exists for devices that cannot host a browser, such as smart TVs, CLI tools, IoT hardware, and printers. Microsoft implements it in Entra ID for Azure CLI, the kubectl Entra plugin, and device enrollment flows.

The flow runs in six steps:

  1. The client requests a device code from Entra ID, specifying resource and scopes
  2. Entra returns a device_code, a human-readable user_code, the verification URL at microsoft.com/devicelogin, and a ~15 minute TTL
  3. The client displays the code and URL to the user
  4. The user opens the URL on a second device, enters the code, signs in, and consents
  5. The client polls the token endpoint with the device_code
  6. Entra issues an access_token and refresh_token to the polling client

The Attack

The critical gap: nothing in the protocol binds the party who initiates the flow to the party who completes authentication. An attacker initiates the flow, obtains a device code, then social-engineers a victim into entering that code on the real microsoft.com/devicelogin. The victim signs in, approves legitimate MFA prompts, and consents. Tokens are issued to the attacker's polling session.

The lure typically mimics a legitimate login request, often claiming a shared document requires authentication. The link points to the actual Microsoft domain, not a lookalike. Every element the victim interacts with is genuine Microsoft infrastructure.

Why It Works

MFA is not technically bypassed. The victim completes it legitimately, and the policy is satisfied. Conditional Access policies see authentication originating from a legitimate Microsoft endpoint, not attacker-controlled redirect infrastructure. The only forensic artifact is an OAuth token issued to a session the attacker controls. The 15-minute device code window provides ample time for social engineering delivery.

Detection

Monitor Entra ID sign-in logs for the authentication method "Device Code Flow." Correlate with user behavior baselines to identify unexpected usage. Tokens granted via this method from unusual locations or for atypical applications warrant investigation. Consider restricting device code flow entirely in environments that do not require it.

The source describes the mechanism from lab-tenant reproductions. No specific IOCs from live incidents are provided.

🔹 devicecodephishing #M365 #OAuth #ConditionalAccess #ThreatIntelligence

🔗 Source: https://trustedsec.com/blog/the-new-hotness-in-phishing-device-code-attacks-in-m365?utm_content=382987031&utm_medium=social&utm_source=twitter&hss_channel=tw-403811306

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TrustedSec @trustedsec@bird.makeup · Jul 21, 2026
Device code phishing is quietly becoming one of the more effective techniques targeting #M365 environments. In our latest #blog, Lumi Taiwo and Danny Dubree detail how it works and the #ConditionalAccess controls that shut it down. Read it now! https://hubs.la/Q04q7lz50
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Erik Jonker @ErikJonker@mastodon.social · Jul 09, 2026
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Mike McBride @mikemac29@infosec.exchange · Jul 08, 2026
M365 News Roundup for - July 2026 Another new Copilot feature = another new cost #M365 #Copilot #Purview #Microsoft https://newsletter.mikemcbride365.com/p/m365-news-roundup-for-july-2026
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Andrew 🌻 Brandt 🐇 @threatresearch@infosec.exchange · Jun 30, 2026
Microsoft 365 users and admins, beware! There's a specific IPv6 range (2a0a:d683::/32) operated by a provider called LSHIY that is engaging in password spraying / brute force login attempts against Microsoft accounts with old, previously leaked credentials that were disclosed as part of prior breaches. The attack bypasses MFA and SSO because it uses deprecated but still functional OAuth Resource Owner Password Credentials 2.0 flow. But it works because some people still use creds that were stolen years ago and were never changed. https://www.huntress.com/blog/lshiy-password-spray-attack #M365 #bruteforce #passwordspray #compromise #weakpasswords
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Michael Mrak 🇦🇹 🇪🇺 @MichaelMrak@mastodon.mrak.at · Feb 21, 2026
Heute bin ich dabei den letzten Schritt meiner #Datenmigration abzuschließen: Nach der Übersiedlung meiner beruflichen #M365 Daten werden nun auch meine privaten Daten, die sich über die letzten 15 Jahre in Hashtag#iCloud angesammelt haben, auf meine in Europa gehostete #Nextcloud Instanz umziehen. Sie wird für mich auch langfristig ein zentraler und verlässlicher Speicherort sein. Selbstverständlich bleibt eines klar: Eine Cloud-Lösung ersetzt kein Backup.
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