@FlUxIuS@infosec.exchange

Sébastien Dudek 📡 @FlUxIuS@infosec.exchange

· 2mo ago

🔐 LUKSbox v0.5.1 is out, and I am pretty happy with this one. 🎉 🪟 TPM 2.0 hardware keyslots now work on Windows through TBS. No driver, no admin rights. Hardware-backed unlock is finally complete across desktop: 🐧 Linux → TPM 2.0 🍎 macOS → Secure Enclave 🪟 Windows → TPM 2.0 🔒 The key stays sealed inside the chip. Copy the vault without it and it is just noise. 🌫️ Apache 2.0, open source. 👉 https://github.com/PentHertz/LUKSbox #encryption #TPM #opensource #infosec #privacy #linux #windows #macos

GitHub

GitHub - PentHertz/LUKSbox: Store sensitive files in the cloud, or on shared media without trusting the host. LUKSbox is a Rust-based encrypted-container tool with passphrase, FIDO2 (YubiKey, Titan, Nitrokey, Windows Hello), TPM 2.0/SEP, and hybrid post-q

Store sensitive files in the cloud, or on shared media without trusting the host. LUKSbox is a Rust-based encrypted-container tool with passphrase, FIDO2 (YubiKey, Titan, Nitrokey, Windows Hello), ...

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Sébastien Dudek 📡 @FlUxIuS@infosec.exchange

· 1mo ago

RF Swift images v1.1.0 📡

🆕 Proxmark5 in the rfid image ➡️ built with PLATFORM=PM5, exposed as pm5 + the four flash wrappers, side by side with pm3 in the same container.

🔧 PM3 install hardened: idempotent re-runs, exec wrappers instead of symlinks (pm3 resolves its install dir from $0), self-repair, build verification.

⬆️ CyberEther 1.9.1, Ghidra 12.1.3, Burp 2026.7.3, Go 1.27, uv 0.12.5, Logic 2.4.46. Ubuntu 26.04 base.

https://rfswift.io

#RFID #Proxmark #SDR #infosec

rfswift.io

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Sébastien Dudek 📡 @FlUxIuS@infosec.exchange

· 1mo ago

🧪 Beta and open source. HydraSDR owners: please break it and tell us how 🙏

📦 github.com/PentHertz/gr-hydrasdr
🚀 rfswift.io

#SDR #RF #OpenSource #Linux

infosec.exchange

Infosec Exchange

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Sébastien Dudek 📡 @FlUxIuS@infosec.exchange

· 1mo ago

📻 Missed this in the RF Swift v3 announcement: we wrote a native OOT module for #HydraSDR, and it ships in RF Swift ⚡

🚫 No SoapySDR, no gr-osmosdr — the full libhydrasdr API as a proper source block.

🎬 Video: container → FM demod, start to finish.

#GNURadio #SDR #HamRadio

infosec.exchange

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Sébastien Dudek 📡 @FlUxIuS@infosec.exchange

· 2mo ago

🚀 RF Swift v3.0.0 "Resonance" is out.

Build a full hardware & RF security lab in seconds ➡️ from ham shack to James Bond engagement. 200+ tools, one command, on Linux, Windows and macOS.

Our biggest release yet:
📦 every image on Ubuntu 26.04
⚙️ CLI rebuilt on the Moby SDK
🧰 new AD / Android / OSINT images

https://github.com/PentHertz/RF-Swift

github.com

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Sébastien Dudek 📡 @FlUxIuS@infosec.exchange

· 7mo ago

Something new in our community and that deserves more attention: Breakdown of BLERP, the BLE re-pairing attacks by
Daniele Antonioli
& Sacchetti (NDSS 2026). TL;DR: the BLE standard doesn't authenticate re-pairing.
Paper + PoC indexed there:
https://community.penthertz.com/t/blerp-ble-re-pairing-attacks-and-defenses/17

BLERP: BLE Re-Pairing Attacks and Defenses

Penthertz Community

BLERP: BLE Re-Pairing Attacks and Defenses

Introduction Last week Daniele Antonioli posted an interesting paper and tooling (two nRF52840 boards, custom NimBLE btshell + Scapy-based Python Host for the double-channel MitM), he did with Tommaso Sacchetti on BLE Re-pairing attacks which probably deserves more attention than it got. This work was presented after 1.5 year of research at Network and Distributed System Security (NDSS) Symposium 2026, and could actually answer some people’s questions → How secure is the re-pairing process i...

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Sébastien Dudek 📡 @FlUxIuS@infosec.exchange

· 2mo ago

Replying to

@lazza@mastodon.social @cryptomator@mastodon.online The cost is exactly what you describe: whole-container reupload without block-level delta, container-level conflict copies instead of per-file ones, and no per-file trash recovery. That's a genuine Cryptomator win in a Dropbox workflow, and I should say so explicitly rather than leaving it implied. The chunked storage layer I'm working on is meant to close that gap ➡️ fixed-boundary encrypted chunks give delta-friendly sync while keeping the container's metadata properties.

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Sébastien Dudek 📡 @FlUxIuS@infosec.exchange

· 2mo ago

Replying to

@lazza@mastodon.social @cryptomator@mastodon.online I'll rework the comparison to separate "threat model" from "sync behaviour" instead of scoring it as one row

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Sébastien Dudek 📡 @FlUxIuS@infosec.exchange

· 2mo ago

Replying to

@lazza@mastodon.social @cryptomator@mastodon.online You're right that the table is too blunt there. "Single file" is a pro against metadata leakage, not against sync cost. A Cryptomator vault reveals file count, individual sizes and, worse, which objects change and when, which is a real traffic-analysis signal. A container hides all of that.

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