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Posts

  • View post

    Most Cloud RAN security problems are not new. They are old telecom weaknesses running on new, cloud-native infrastructure. Our new whitepaper covers what we find in testing: a single malformed packet crashing a virtualised DU over the fronthaul, rogue DU and CU nodes on F1/E1, the OAM plane and Kubernetes escalation, plus a mitigation framework. https://www.p1sec.com/white-paper/cloud-ran-security #CloudRAN #5G #TelecomSecurity

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    diameter-db is now public: a free, machine-processable reference of Diameter applications, AVPs and command codes for the 4G core. 169 applications ยท 239 commands ยท 2,988 AVPs Browse, search, or export to SQLite, CSV or a SQLAlchemy schema. Source on GitHub. https://diameter-db.p1sec.fr/ #Diameter #TelecomSecurity #4G

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    11 September 2026: the Cyber Resilience Act&amp;#39;s reporting obligations start applying. Manufacturers of products with digital elements must report actively exploited vulnerabilities and severe incidents, with an early warning inside 24 hours. Telecom equipment is in scope, and detecting exploitation of your own product inside someone else&amp;#39;s network is the hard part. https://www.p1sec.com/services/supply-chain-security #TelecomSecurity #SupplyChainSecurity

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    A CVE feed says a vulnerability exists. It does not say what it does inside a mobile network. The P1 Vulnerability Knowledge Base holds 2,200+ telecom vulnerabilities across SS7, SIGTRAN, Diameter, GTP, IMS, LTE and 5G, searchable by protocol, network domain and element, each with impact and remediation context. It is a reference, not a scanner. https://www.p1sec.com/product/vulnerability-knowledge-base #TelecomSecurity #VulnerabilityManagement

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    Tomorrow, live with Titan.ium: Offense vs Defense in Telecom Security. One of our auditors connects to a mobile network the way a roaming partner would, and shows what it hands over. Titan.ium then shows what it takes to block that at the signalling firewall, in real time. Real SS7 and SMS Home Routing weaknesses, turned into firewall rules on screen. 15 September, 16:00 to 17:00 CEST. https://titaniumplatform.com/webinar-offense-vs-defense-in-telecom-security #TelecomSecurity #SS7

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    If you have ever tried to point a new engineer at one place to learn mobile network security, you will know there is not one. So here is ours. 14 chapters, 191 articles: SS7, Diameter, GTP-C, 5G SBA, O-RAN, IMS and VoLTE, SUPI/SUCI and eSIM, the STP/DEA/SEPP border, detection, testing, regulation. Click a domain on the network map, or start at your generation and read forward. No gate, no form, no download. www.p1sec.com/ugtmns #telecom #infosec

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    Interconnect filtering decides which signalling messages may reach the subscriber database. It says nothing about how the HLR or HSS answers when the question is malformed. Assessing the element itself is a separate discipline: the virtualisation layer, the management interfaces, SS7 and Diameter stack handling, and the software underneath. Our research whitepaper: https://www.p1sec.com/white-paper/hacking-telco-equipment #TelecomSecurity #MobileNetworkSecurity

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    A penetration test describes the network on the day it was tested. Between assessments a live network gains new elements, new interconnects, new 3GPP features, uneven patching and configuration drift. Each one is a change to the attack surface. Re-testing an estate audited a few years earlier reliably surfaces new exposure. Assessment belongs on a cycle, paired with continuous signalling visibility. https://www.p1sec.com/ugtmns #TelecomSecurity #MobileNetworkSecurity

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    O-RAN didn&amp;#39;t make the RAN insecure. It made it documented. WG11 specifies TLS, IPsec, OAuth 2.0 and 802.1X for the open interfaces. For most of them, support is mandatory and enabling them is a deployment choice. That supported-versus-enabled gap is fixable, and the first thing to check. Our new whitepaper covers the interfaces, the RIC and xApps, a lab fronthaul DoS on an open-source O-RU emulator, and supply chain integrity. https://www.p1sec.com/white-paper/o-ran-security #ORAN #O...

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    The AMF sits where three trust boundaries meet: NAS from the device over N1, NGAP from the gNB over N2, HTTP/2 towards the rest of the 5G core over the SBI. Our AMF Under Pressure webinar replay walks through AMF attack paths from P1 Security pentesting and research on the 5G core. https://watch.getcontrast.io/register/p1-security-amf-under-pressure-5g-core-security-risks-attack-paths-and-lessons-learned #5GSecurity #TelecomSecurity #MobileNetworkSecurity

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    P1 Security will be at India Mobile Congress 2026, 7 to 10 October at Yashobhoomi, New Delhi. The theme is &amp;quot;Scale Without Boundaries&amp;quot;. In a mobile network, every boundary you scale across (a roaming partner, an interconnect, a 5G core function) is also a trust boundary. Want to talk SS7, Diameter, GTP-C or 5G core security while you are there? We are attending, not exhibiting, so book a slot with our team: https://www.p1sec.com/contact #IMC2026 #TelecomSecurity #5GSecurity

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    QCSuper has a sequel: DiagNG. A new GUI-based open source tool for Linux (GTK 4/Adwaita) that produces PCAP/GSMTAP captures from Qualcomm Snapdragon basebands, plus NR/5G RRC logs in Wireshark via GSMTAP v3 and a custom Lua plug-in. GPL v3. Flatpak, plus Ubuntu and Arch Linux packages. Launch post and demo: https://www.p1sec.com/blog/presenting-diagng-open-source-qcsuper-successor Code: https://github.com/P1sec/DiagNG #Wireshark #OpenSource #Telecom

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    All-IP voice rebuilt the international interconnect on SIP. With home-routed roaming (S8-HR, N9-HR), a partner&amp;#39;s traffic lands straight back in the home IMS core, on a link that tends to be trusted. Our new whitepaper covers the interconnect anatomy, four threat families from toll fraud to single-message DoS, and where a signalling-aware SIP IDS fits alongside the SBC and the firewall. https://www.p1sec.com/white-paper/sip-interconnect-security-sip-ids #VoLTE #IMS #TelecomSecurity

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    Live today at 15:00 CEST: Inside a telecom security assessment. Martin Kacer walks through how mobile networks are actually tested, from scoping to re-test, SS7 to 5G, and what each kind of test misses. Free, with Q&amp;amp;A and replay: https://watch.getcontrast.io/register/p1-security-inside-a-telecom-security-assessment-methods-and-tooling-for-mobile-networks?utm_source=mastodon&amp;amp;utm_medium=social&amp;amp;utm_campaign=webinar-19-live-today #TelecomSecurity #InfoSec

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    In telecom security, the first problem is often not fixing exposure. It is **seeing it clearly**. So we built **TelcoASM Risk Exposure**. A free assessment tool that helps telecom security professionals quickly visualize risk exposure across mobile network domains and compare their position against aggregated industry benchmarks. No heavy process. No full audit. No endless spreadsheet archaeology. Just a fast, structured way to answer: **Where are we exposed, and what should we look at fir...

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    Cyber conflict has a long memory. One point from this TelcoSec Talk replay that really stands out is how certain methods do not just disappear. They resurface, evolve, and show up again in new contexts. In this clip, Hamid Kashfi touches on that pattern through the Iran cyber landscape, and why looking at single incidents in isolation is rarely enough. The real value comes from understanding how tactics develop over time and how events connect across a longer timeline. That is also what makes...

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    Open source keeps telecom innovation moving. It also needs real protocol level security testing. At P1 Security, we help open source projects become more robust and secure by identifying implementation weaknesses before attackers get a free lab. A recent example is ๐„๐ฅ๐ฅ๐š ๐‚๐จ๐ซ๐ž, where our team uncovered multiple AMF denial of service vulnerabilities triggered by malformed NGAP and NAS traffic. These findings were discovered by Telecom Security Experts at P1 Security. Their research uncovered a...

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    If you still think APTs only care about endpoints, this webinar will change your threat model. In Physical to 5G Core Compromise, we break down why telecom infrastructure is a high value target for nation state actors, what they are realistically trying to achieve, and how those objectives map to concrete attack paths across RAN, transport, management, and core. What you will take away The attacker goals behind real world telecom intrusions Where โ€œtemporaryโ€ operational exceptions turn into lo...

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    One malformed message. That&amp;#39;s all it takes. In our latest write-up, we show how a single UE- or gNB-originated signaling message can travel across the network and crash core functions that are not directly exposed โ€” AMF, SMF, even MME in LTE. Across both 5G and 4G, the same failure patterns appear: Parsers assuming well-formed NAS payloads NGAP handlers trusting mandatory IEs will always be present EPCO fields that are forwarded untouched until they break the SMF Stateful procedures t...

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    ๐—–๐—น๐—ผ๐˜‚๐—ฑ ๐—ฅ๐—”๐—ก ๐—ฐ๐—ต๐—ฎ๐—ป๐—ด๐—ฒ๐˜€ ๐˜๐—ต๐—ฒ ๐—ฅ๐—”๐—ก ๐—ฎ๐˜๐˜๐—ฎ๐—ฐ๐—ธ ๐˜€๐˜‚๐—ฟ๐—ณ๐—ฎ๐—ฐ๐—ฒ. ๐—ง๐—ผ๐—บ๐—ผ๐—ฟ๐—ฟ๐—ผ๐˜„, ๐˜„๐—ฒ ๐˜‚๐—ป๐—ฝ๐—ฎ๐—ฐ๐—ธ ๐˜„๐—ต๐—ฎ๐˜ ๐˜๐—ต๐—ฎ๐˜ ๐—ฟ๐—ฒ๐—ฎ๐—น๐—น๐˜† ๐—บ๐—ฒ๐—ฎ๐—ป๐˜€. As mobile networks move toward virtualised, distributed, and cloud native RAN architectures, the security model changes with them. New interfaces. New operational complexity. New assumptions. And, in some cases, old risks becoming reachable in new ways. Tomorrow, we will host a technical webinar: ๐—–๐—น๐—ผ๐˜‚๐—ฑ ๐—ฅ๐—”๐—ก ๐—ฆ๐—ฒ๐—ฐ๐˜‚๐—ฟ๐—ถ๐˜๐˜†: ๐—˜๐˜…๐—ฝ๐—น๐—ผ๐—ฟ๐—ถ๐—ป๐—ด ๐—ก๐—ฒ๐˜„ ๐—ง๐—ต๐—ฟ๐—ฒ๐—ฎ๐˜๐˜€ Join Kye Grundy and Laurent Ghigonis for a session on how Cloud RAN de...

  • View post

    Generic IT security was built for IP and web traffic. It does not read SS7, Diameter or GTP-C, so the attacks that hurt operators (location tracking, Diameter abuse, GTP-C misuse, SMS fraud) pass through the firewall undetected. A telecom IDS is the missing layer. PTM runs passively on live signalling and surfaces attacks, fraud and DoS in real time, on a dashboard SOC and fraud teams can act on. How it works: https://www.p1sec.com/product/intrusion-detection-system-ptm #TelecomSecurity #Intr...

  • View post

    Your voice core now speaks SIP. VoLTE, VoWiFi and VoNR run on SIP inside the IMS core, so they inherit IP-style risks: spoofing, signalling manipulation, malformed messages and weak transport. At international SIP interconnect, partner trust widens the surface. SBCs alone miss it, which is where telecom-aware SIP IDS earns its place. Read more: https://www.p1sec.com/blog/international-ip-sip-security-risks-in-ims-roaming-and-the-real-role-of-sip-ids #TelecomSecurity #IMS #VoLTE

  • View post

    5G standalone doesn&amp;#39;t run on SS7 or Diameter. Inside the core, network functions talk over a service-based architecture: HTTP/2, JSON, REST APIs on the SBI, discovery via the NRF, trust via TLS and OAuth2 tokens. Good for agility, but it imports web-app risk into the core: broken authorization between NFs, over-broad tokens, injection, weak TLS. API attacks, not signaling, so SS7 rules never see them. Guide: https://securityhub.p1sec.com/guide #5GSecurity #TelecomSecurity

  • View post

    The AMF terminates three interfaces, each trusting a different neighbour: the device (N1/NAS), the radio (N2/NGAP), and peer NFs over HTTP/2 (SBI). Three interfaces, three classes of risk. Free webinar on the attack paths on each, and the mitigations we recommend. Wed 29 July, 15:00 to 16:00 CET. Register: https://watch.getcontrast.io/register/p1-security-amf-under-pressure-5g-core-security-risks-attack-paths-and-lessons-learned #5G #TelecomSecurity

  • View post

    Live in under an hour: AMF Under Pressure. N1, N2, SBI. Three interfaces into the AMF, each trusting a different neighbour. El Mehdi Regragui walks through the attack paths across each, from P1 Security penetration testing and vulnerability research on the 5G core, plus why the OAM and container layer widens the blast radius. Today, Wednesday 29 July, 15:00 to 16:00 CET. Replay for everyone who registers. https://watch.getcontrast.io/register/p1-security-amf-under-pressure-5g-core-security-ri...

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    One vendor compromised, and you are inside many 5G cores at once, not one. No internet exposure needed. In our AMF Under Pressure webinar, El Mehdi Regragui walks the supply chain path into the 5G core: malicious code shipped inside a network function, arriving as a rogue NF already trusted on the SBI. Full session, 1h11 including the Q&amp;amp;A: https://watch.getcontrast.io/watch/p1-security-amf-under-pressure-5g-core-security-risks-attack-paths-and-lessons-learned?utm_source=mastodon&amp;am...

  • View post

    We are at LEAP 2026 in Riyadh, 31 August to 3 September. Vikas Sharma is there for P1 Security. Not exhibiting, just taking meetings. If you operate a mobile network in the region, regulate one, or run critical services on top of one, we are happy to compare notes on what the signalling layer actually exposes: SS7, Diameter, GTP, IMS, 5G core and RAN. contact@p1sec.com #LEAP26 #TelecomSecurity

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    The most damaging things we find in 5G core pentests are almost never exotic. Our new whitepaper collects what P1 Security&amp;#39;s team actually finds when it tests production and pre-production 5G standalone cores. Five recurring classes: - Authentication and access control: default credentials, hardcoded secrets, reused root SSH keys - Remote code execution, still most often in the OAM domain - Privilege escalation, including Kubernetes pod-to-cluster and pod-to-host - Server-side reque...

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    Ask an operator where its attack surface is and the answer depends who is in the room: SS7, GTP, IMS, RAN, OAM. Each answer is right and none is complete. TelcoASM, the Telco Attack Surface Matrix, puts the domains in one structured self-assessment: 4G and 5G core, signalling, IMS and VoLTE, RAN, management platforms, supply chain. No scan, confidential. https://telcoasm.p1sec.com #TelecomSecurity #AttackSurface

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    Smishing is treated as an inbox problem. It isn&#39;t. The text can look ordinary. The abuse is in how the message is injected: sender identity spoofed over SS7, A2P grey routes slipping past the SMSC. A content filter reads the words, never the origin or route. Catching SMS fraud at scale needs signalling-layer visibility, not better wordlists. https://www.p1sec.com/blog/sms-based-attacks-the-hidden-threat-still-exploiting-mobile-networks #TelecomSecurity #SS7 #Smishing