Nokia Deepfield
deepfield@infosec.exchange
<p>Deepfield, part of Nokia since 2017, delivers advanced network analytics and real-time DDoS protection to secure global networks.</p>
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New Linux DDoS bot: Ourobot. 12 flood methods, SYN to GRE to TCP fragments. C2: 201.7.16[.]231:11121 Dropper: hxxp://power.belyxhost[.]in/payload.sh Backup C2: ENS bossmen.eth, text key "ouroboros" SHA256: 03436d1cf6b64faf682b8c7cd386e415d07a3eaa703f83419512d5c939adabf1 Blockchain C2 is very in right now. Ourobot has it: its hardcoded IP, on Ethereum, via curl. Very current. #DDoS #botnet
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Potassium update: the Mirai fork @synthient reported in March (https://x.com/deobfuscately/status/2033923869782712514) is still active and the operator appears to have taken up Dutch poetry. The new C2 domain is ikhebkankerinmijnrechterteelbal[.]st (would not recommend pasting that into Google Translate during standup.) Same key material and HTTP C2 protocol as the original potassium.vitacoco...[.]st variant. 11-port random C2 rotation, spreading via ADB to Android TV boxes. IoCs: a87aa7995ee...
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#TerraBot: first #DDoS botnet we&#39;ve seen carrying a working exploit for CVE-2026-0073 (Critical ADB auth bypass, patched May 2026). Every other ADB botnet needs auth disabled; this one doesn&#39;t. Comes with 30+ methods + dual APK/ELF cross-platform worming. C2: terrabot.qzz[.]io:69 Staging: 140.233.190[.]47 (AS214209) hash: a532a072687f5bd6f8f4c2fb1ce899a5d3c4264453fe2e7bafc270e83661c893 #threatintel
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New report: #Datasurge, a rogue EDR agent with a DDoS module. Mirai fork organized around retention, not acquisition. The operator exploits ADB, then lets a scanner/killer module ensure nothing else gets to run. (It&#39;s larger than the DDoS engine.) Entropy heuristic, inotify watcher, directory lockdown, and a C2 toggle so the operator can briefly lower the drawbridge to deploy updates. The config table cipher is ROT13 followed by single-byte XOR; the PRNG is seeded through a ChaCha-l...
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New report: #kbotne, or: Mirai learns WebSocket, naturally calls it /connectlol Standard RFC 6455 upgrade on port 80, which is novel for a Mirai fork. Everything around it is less careful: hex-encoded config strings recoverable with xxd, a process killer that mostly recognizes its own binaries, and persistence that writes itself to `/.kbotne/kbotne`. Stealth was not the design goal. https://github.com/deepfield/public-research/blob/main/kbotne/report.md #threatintel #DDoS
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New, from our ERT: what happens when you disconnect from that free VPN app, loaded with a residential proxy SDK that talks to the Vo1d/Popa infrastructure. https://github.com/deepfield/public-research/blob/main/reports/2026-06-18-robovpn-neunative.md #threatintel #popa
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Somebody sat down and wrote a from-scratch QUIC client for a DDoS bot. No WolfSSL, no mbedTLS, nothing off the shelf: TLS 1.3, QUIC v1, HTTP/3, all hand-rolled. A more complete QUIC stack than some things you installed on purpose. Then it validates zero certificates. New ERT report on Vibenet, aka Heilong: https://github.com/deepfield/public-research/blob/main/vibenet/report.md #DDoS #threatintel
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AsconBot Novel multi-arch DDoS bot via ADB — ASCON-128 AEAD + key-ratchet C2 C2: 168.220.248[.]106:24032 (live) SHA256: 96f926f634fe67a384d577612157472f7aae9db5c0651730dc9d98360b9e8766 #threatintel #malware #iocs
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We’d genuinely rather write the other report: the one where a bad actor goes legit. The door stays open and we’d take that story gladly. Maskify/Earnify isn’t it. Since April it forked into a proxy-only SDK and a standalone Linux DDoS bot, now flooding Ukrainian ISPs (Triolan, Kyivstar), Russian scrubbing providers, game servers, and, inevitably, Krebs. Our latest: https://github.com/deepfield/public-research/blob/main/maskify/report-2026-07-04-two-fleets.md #threatintel #DDoS
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New, from our ERT: https://github.com/deepfield/public-research/blob/main/ipmoyu/report.md The APK is clean. No sample would have tipped us off; the traffic did. A DNS hunt on networks we protect flagged devices beaconing to an unlisted BADBOX C2. We pivoted on the shared infrastructure to a free IPTV app dropping a residential-proxy exit node. Skip the cable bill, get a tenant. The ERT tracks DDoS, not IPTV (though Deepfield does track video for analytics). But an exit node isn’t video. It’s...
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New, from our ERT: Most residential proxy malware hides the exit behind an outbound tunnel. This one has the victim’s own router open 165 ports over UPnP and labels every mapping RELAY. Telemetry on the proxy domains led us back to #Jackskid, a DDoS botnet we have tracked since late 2025. Same operator behind all of it: a pure relay family, a Mirai bot that moonlights as one, and Jackskid, which now compiles the relay straight in. https://github.com/deepfield/public-research/blob/main/reports...
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New ERT report: #IranBot is a botnet built to be thrown away. Three builds in six weeks, no infrastructure reused, each one cruder and each one reaching further. The build stripped of encryption is the one worming today, and its C2 outlives none of the others by much. https://github.com/deepfield/public-research/blob/main/iranbot/report.md #threatintel #DDoS
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DDoSia is one of the least interesting botnets we track. We wrote it up anyway. Its product was never downtime. It’s the claim of downtime. We looked at the actual traffic. The honest version is boring. And boring is the one story the group can’t turn into a win. New from our ERT: https://github.com/deepfield/public-research/blob/main/ddosia/report.md #threatintel #NoName057
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On 26 February 2025, the Nokia Deepfield Emergency Response Team (ERT) identified a significant new DDoS botnet, now tracked under #Eleven11bot Primarily composed of compromised webcams and Network Video Recorders (NVRs), this botnet has rapidly grown to exceed 30,000 devices. Its size is exceptional among non-state actor botnets, making it one of the largest known DDoS botnet campaigns observed since the invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. Eleven11bot has targeted diverse sectors, includin...
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Nothing says &quot;controlled chaos&quot; like a live DDoS demo where the attacker literally has paperwork from the Ministry of Finance. (And yes, this is in-line Layer 2 mitigation on a live network.) https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BxsEaXUT94k
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We reached a point with #DDoS attacks are now affecting shared infrastructure — well beyond the intended targets. Read on to learn about why networks need to address outbound DDoS traffic, and to build defenses as part of the network. https://www.nokia.com/blog/the-internet-commons-under-siege-why-33-tbps-ddos-attacks-are-everyones-problem/
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New deployment: @hetzner is strengthening #DDoS protection across its European data center infrastructure with Deepfield Defender; a great choice by one of Europe&#39;s leading hosting providers. https://hetzner.com/pressroom/nokia-network-security/
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Why bother with n-day exploits when a residential proxy subscription gives you unauthenticated root shell on tens of millions of Android TV devices? Our new ERT report on the #Katana botnet documents 30K+ bots, an on-device compiled kernel rootkit, and almost certainly more engineering effort in persistence than the devices received in firmware support. https://github.com/deepfield/public-research/blob/main/katana/report.md #DDoS #threatintel
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Excellent work by @nicter_jp documenting a Xiongmai DVR campaign deploying residential proxy SDKs: https://blog.nicter.jp/2026/03/iot_proxyware/ We pulled the payloads and decompiled the chain. The downloader is Mirai with all DDoS stripped out — repurposed as a vehicle for proxy monetization. It delivers two proxy SDKs: IPRoyal Pawns and PacketSDK, part of the IPIDEA network Google disrupted in January. NICTER&#39;s IOC timeline tells the rest: PacketSDK v1.0.2 (original domains) → v1.0....
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Yesterday, the U.S. Department of Justice announced a coordinated international operation to disrupt four of the world&#39;s largest IoT DDoS botnets — Aisuru, Kimwolf, Jackskid, and Mossad — responsible for record-breaking attacks reaching approximately 30 Tbps. Together, these botnets had hijacked over three million devices worldwide and launched hundreds of thousands of DDoS attacks against victims across the globe. This was a massive collaborative effort involving law enforcement agenc...
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RE: https://infosec.exchange/@jmeyer/116259050557048999 ICYMI: a story about pulling one thread linking multiple botnets — four of which were targeted by coordinated law enforcement actions this week, and an adjacent one for which our team publishes the C2 decryption scheme. #aisuru #kimwolf #mossad #jackskid #cecilio
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Most Mirai forks are disposable. #Jackskid was built not to be. Joint research with Comcast Threat Research Labs — we tracked this botnet across 80+ samples and 13 build generations as it evolved from a bare-bones prototype into a dual-vector Android TV/IoT platform with triple-layer encryption and DNS-over-HTTPS C2. Report and IoCs: https://github.com/deepfield/public-research/blob/main/jackskid/report.md #threatintel #ddos
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RE: https://infosec.exchange/@jmeyer/116393381297187934 Latest report from our ERT on another proxy/ADB-based botnet: #Maskify https://github.com/deepfield/public-research/blob/main/maskify/report.md