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@NathanHarvey@kolektiva.social

2025-05-08 03:50 UTC

@TobyBartels @highergeometer @sibrosan It can be hard to talk of metamathematics in ways that don’t reify unobserved absolutes, but let me try from the opposite direction. In folk language, we know what we mean when we ask for half of something. There is a vague notion of transforming that thing into something countable and then splitting the counts in some manual way. The semantics have those beautiful fuzzy boundaries of folk languages, but we talk about halves and quarters all the time and it works out. The key is that we live with engineering tolerances in “the real world” (or whatever one’s philosophy of experience). This is even true of natural numbers! Ever messed up the counting game yourself? Now, with economic exchange or the arbitration of rights and resource, there has always been pressure towards improving accuracy, but our drive to model our environment increasingly sets up demand to _operationalize_ those things. Can we set up experiments where we talk about half of a thing? We do use those kinds of numbers. Can we observe variation somehow, and maybe measure it? When we look to formalize a language to capture a certain semantics, the formalization process is really just operationalization. Or, at least that is one viewpoint that drives certain strains of radical constructivism that overlap with ultrafinitism. So when you question whether you could ever get direct experience of fractions, you are looking to make that operationalization “complete”. Those of this constructivist persuasion might point out that no one’s ever done that before, that no one’s ever been able to get absolute accuracy, and that the idea might be a noble goal to pursue but is not a thing we’ve yet had in experience. With fractions, I can get a fraction to the limits of my own vision pretty easily. I can split something in half, and even if I’m sloppy and don’t get it right so it’s obviously wrong, I can focus on fixing the wrong and in a few steps be happy they are the same. But I think when most constructivists approach fractions, it’s from the more natural “1/7 is 1 out of 7, so I can make seven copies of something and then one of them is 1/7 the whole”. So if you have interpretations of countable things, you have interpretations of fractions already. Certain forms of ultrafinitism come from this neo-empiricist kind of intuitionism that takes semantics seriously. It’s that idea that a scientific model of mathematics follows from Tarski’s founding of metamathematics in experience or reality - that math is a process in our world, that we implement that process manipulating symbols as machines with our words and our writings and our transistors. Ultrafinitism even from early Esenin-Volpin has been strongly associated with this idea that the meaningful stuff we can talk about is what we have in existing operationalizations. The completions, the infinities - these are not meaningful. They do not share interpretations with the finite. We do not experience them. This scientific view looks to be honest about what is actually measured in our world, which is meaningful. If discussion is about numbers existing, for instance, this approach will want to be very clear that existence is semantic. Now, the imaginary stuff may be meaningless, but that doesn’t mean it is useless. I think many ultrafinitists have done work that involves finite but unspecified fragments of potentially infinite sequences, for instance, and many readily admit the usefulness of considering the constraints derived from the completions as constraints on the finite. Often they guide attempts to derive things in more purely ultrafinitist ways. That same dynamic drove early constructivists to attempt to find constructive proofs of classical theorems. Being guided by imaginary completions has a lot of use. Anyway, I don’t want to appear that I can faithfully represent Wildberger or even ultrafinitism. My own views don’t fully align with the positions as I understand them. But I do appreciate the focus on semantics, and it seems really backward in my eyes when I see others laughing at that view and pretending that they’ve experienced these completed infinite processes and know they exist. I know they haven’t. I know it’s lies. Everyone does. But it’s that part of math where the habit is to lie, where we pretend because we really like the imaginary things, so as a culture it’s accepted that when we talk about semantic types like truth and existence, we don’t really mean truth and existence. And anyone who thinks otherwise is silly.

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