2025-10-02 13:01 UTC
As to question (1), the article isn’t super clear. But it’s worth pointing out that Apple doesn’t just provide end-to-end encryption for backups through their ADP feature. They also provide end-to-end encrypted backup for health data, web history and passwords, even without ADP.
So “we want a backdoor to access iCloud encryption” could mean access to those password vaults and secure health data. This means Apple would have to disable those features in the UK as well, or deploy new insecure encryption code that could affect users globally.
It’s also possible that the UK is asking for a backdoor in Apple’s iMessage text messaging system. That isn’t technically “iCloud” but it’s adjacent enough that I could see it getting presented that way. This would not be the first time the UK gov expressed interest in that.
What’s worrying here is that the UK government seems absolutely determined to access user private data, no matter the bad press and the consequences. And they’re now willing to do it overtly. Between this and recent moves against encryption in the EU, we’re going to a bad place.
Replies (1)
-
@matthew_d_green@ioc.exchange 2025-10-02 13:02
A final note: it’s not totally clear what the UK is asking for here, but one theory is: they want access to foreign users who have ADP encryption on, but are on UK soil (for example, foreign diplomats.) This would be a technical nightmare, but it fits the facts. Would be a technical nightmare because now you’d have two versions of Apple encryption, where the security changes depending on where in the world you are (ie your IP address.) This is so dangerous that it’s tantamount to a global backdoor, including against US citizens.