Post #614057

2026-03-10 12:09 UTC

Ahh I see. I read about and watched few documentaries about Xu Xiadong who criticized kungfu masters and lost social credit (among other things) and couldn’t rent, own property, stay in certain hotels, travel on high speed rail, or buy plane tickets. I guess that was not true then. The bit about data handover. I guess the center for internet security is misinformed so is the australian strategic policy institute, department of homeland security, and NCSC. About the app, BBC is probably where it comes from, it’s more for debtors and not with people with bad social credit but I suppose there is an overlap. So this didn’t make it pass the trial phase?

Replies (1)

@QinShiHuangsShlong__dup_67153@lemmy.ml 2026-03-10 12:25

The Xu Xiaodong case actually illustrates the exact point I was making. He wasn’t punished for “criticizing kung fu masters” or for having the wrong opinions. What happened is that he lost a defamation lawsuit and the court ordered him to apologize and pay damages. He refused to comply with the ruling, and because of that he was placed on the judgment-defaulter list (失信被执行人). Chinese reporting describes the reason as “有履行能力而拒不履行生效法律文书确定义务”, having the ability to comply with a court judgment but refusing to do so. Once someone is on that list, courts can impose high-consumption restrictions (限制高消费), which include things like flights, certain high-speed rail tickets, and luxury hotels until the judgment is fulfilled. In other words, the trigger was refusing to carry out a court order, not some general punishment for speech. On the data issue, you’re citing reports from Western government-linked think tanks and security NGOs, which obviously approach the topic from a national security perspective. China’s cybersecurity and data laws (like the Cybersecurity Law and Data Security Law) exist because the state wants control over critical data flows, infrastructure security, and cross-border data transfer. That approach isn’t unique in principle; governments everywhere are tightening control over data because it has become a strategic resource. But those laws are regulatory frameworks about data governance, not mechanisms that automatically “ruin someone’s social credit.” The think-tank papers you cited are describing geopolitical risk concerns, not explaining how the Chinese court enforcement system actually works. On the app point, what the BBC article referred to were tools connected to the court defaulter database, sometimes nicknamed things like a “laolai map.” That’s basically a searchable database of people who have lost a case and then refused to comply with the judgment, which courts use to pressure them to comply. Many countries have debtor registries or public enforcement records; the difference here is mostly presentation. Western coverage often framed it as part of a sinister “social credit” ecosystem when in reality it was tied to a specific court enforcement list, not a universal citizen score. It’s good to have a database of those who have defrauded people. And to be honest, the BBC has a long history of framing Chinese policy in a particular narrative, so it’s not surprising that nuance tends to disappear. The reality is that some of these mechanisms absolutely exist, but how they work, who they apply to, and what they actually do is often somewhere between heavy exaggeration and outright fantasy in viral discussions. What exists in practice is a mixture of court enforcement lists, regulatory blacklists, and sector-specific compliance systems. Turning that into a story about every citizen having a constantly changing “social credit score” controlling their life is a much simpler narrative, but it’s not how the underlying policies are actually structured.

Open ##614183