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@ravirockks@infosec.exchange

2026-08-18 00:49 UTC

'Although amateur proxies are often easier for authorities to identify and disrupt, they can be used at a scale that strains the finite resources of intelligence and law-enforcement agencies. '... amateurs recruited to carry out physical attacks on locations and people are often less effective and more reckless ... limited command and control ... This risks escalation if a proxy accidentally conducts a high-profile or mass-casualty attack. Indications in a Chinese TNR case in June 2026 suggested some proxies are even subcontracting ...' https://www.iiss.org/online-analysis/online-analysis/2026/08/the-intelligence-operative-gig-economy-from-surveillance-to-sabotage/

Replies (1)

  • @ravirockks@infosec.exchange 2026-08-24 00:32

    'A building belonging to Milrem Robotics [one of UKR's 2 foreign UGV vendors] ... was set ablaze overnight on Aug 15. 'Earlier this year, a fire virtually destroyed a Czech plant making drones and thermal optics for Ukraine. 'Lithuania also charged six people over an attempt to burn down a factory supplying radio-wave scanners to Kyiv. 'On Aug 10, a major explosion ripped through a plant belonging to [Bulgaria's] EMCO ... which produces 155mm artillery ammunition for Ukraine. 'Three days later a similar blast rocked a munitions factory operated by KNDS Ammo Italy in Colleferro on the outskirts of Rome. '... GRU officers cultivate sources within criminal gangs to act as intermediaries ... using online messaging apps such as Telegram. '[These] middlemen who dish out the local tasks to recruits, who are paid in cryptocurrency and often never find out they are working for the Russians. 'With each attack that goes unpunished, the Russians are gathering their own useful intelligence on just how far they can push Nato’s boundaries'. https://archive.md/5cw3B

    Open ##4771994