Post #4386786

'The first was on Feb. 17, 2022, showing the axes of Putin’s invasion plan ... We set up a discrete team ... We had remarkable insight into a conflict where we weren’t a party — and we had to decide what you can do with that. 'What we understood less clearly was how Ukraine intended to fight. The Ukrainians were loath to share their plans with anyone, sometimes even among themselves ... 'We were realistic about all those [Russian] faults. What we didn’t imagine was that Russia would fall over all of them simultaneously. 'Instead of separate military and civilian capabilities, we have a single entity [NCF] that can operate across the spectrum: cybercrime, online child sexual exploitation, terrorism, hostile states, and ultimately wartime targets. '... the usefulness of any combination depends on the target, the technology and the moment, and opportunities are often temporary. So you need a campaigning approach ... But it needs to be nested within wider campaigns. 'If we’re going to adopt a longer-term campaigning approach, we need consistency, in resourcing but also in intent and structure. 'But the real ambition is broader: anybody’s sensor to anybody’s shooter. A Royal Navy system might detect a threat that’s then struck by a Netherlands Air Force aircraft. 'Uncrewed and autonomous systems are largely data engines — they need so much support that if you get the underpinning architecture wrong, you won’t exploit them. 'The first cohort did a short period of basic military training and then went straight into specialist cyber instruction. They joined in August and graduated in November, and within months they were working in the National Cyber Force and defensive cyber units. '... only one dropped out. That’s far below the normal attrition in military training. We were reaching highly motivated people who might never have joined through the conventional system'. https://therecord.media/interview-jim-hockenhull-uk-defence-intelligence-russia-ukraine