@david_chisnall@infosec.exchange
Post #4327164
2026-08-02 09:58 UTC
@bazkie@beige.party
No, I think you don’t understand what a TPM does. A TPM provides a set of cryptographic primitives and key storage, as well as a set of PCRs that allow you to record boot state so that keys can be stored in such a way that they can be released (or derived) only when the boot has met some external policy.
On top of a TPM, you can build whatever policies you like. Linux can it for disk encryption so that you must boot GRUB then a Linux kernel signed with a specific key, then enter a passphrase to get access to your files. If someone boots Windows, they cannot access the key for the files. Things on top of Linux can use it for storing a secret that’s used with key derivation and a signing flow to ensure that WebAuthn keys cannot be leaked (though they can be used) even if an attacker manages to use a privilege-elevation exploit and compromise your kernel. Neither of these is moving power to a corporation.
Your argument is like saying you refuse to ever put a lock on your front door because slave labour camps use locks. The problem isn’t the lock, it’s who holds the key.
Replies (1)
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@bazkie@beige.party 2026-08-02 10:05
@david_chisnall@infosec.exchange no, I think you don’t understand what a TPM does. a TPM provides an non-removable fingerprint that corporations can use to identify your device. also, they can force you to use TPM'ed hardware, by having their software/hardware/services not work without one; thereby forcing you to use only hardware that corporations, or later, governments, "approve of". this is the groundwork of a forced identification ecosystem that we are being moved towards. no thanks.