Post #4093331

@sgt1372@sfba.social @drahardja@sfba.social studies show otherwise. Pardon the AI summary, but the cited sources are available for inspection: Studies supporting the “repeat player effect” Lisa Bingham’s early 1997 studies of AAA employment arbitration found employers attain more favorable outcomes in arbitration outside the collective bargaining context, attributing this partly to employers having more information for arbitrator selection and influence on arbitrators who may want to rule in the employer’s favor to be picked for future cases. Alexander Colvin’s 2011 study of employment arbitration case outcomes and processes is one of the most-cited empirical looks at this, building on Bingham’s work. A study by Shauhin Talesh and Peter Alter examined how arbitration system design and arbitrator training shape the extent to which repeat players gain advantages in arbitration hearings, based on observing actual hearings in private and state-run systems. Pushback on the effect itself It’s worth noting this isn’t settled science. A more recent, more rigorous study (Chandrasekher, via Columbia) found that Bingham’s early work relied on simple t-tests that provided only suggestive evidence, and that empirical research into the repeat player effect is still fairly embryonic — while several studies do show repeat-playing companies outperform one-shot litigants, this may stem more from company-specific characteristics than from systemic arbitration bias. Another critique argues the effect has achieved almost mythical status through studies that are as full of methodological holes as they are of supportable conclusions. A separate, less disputed finding Beyond win-rate comparisons, there’s strong evidence that forced arbitration suppresses claims from ever being filed at all — a large majority of people who face mandatory arbitration abandon their claims before filing, which some researchers argue is a bigger structural effect than any bias in the arbitrations that do happen. So: yes, real studies exist, several point toward a real tilt (via arbitrator selection, information asymmetry, and the incentive arbitrators have to please repeat corporate clients), but methodologically rigorous critics argue the size and even the existence of a genuine “bias” effect (versus other confounds) is still debated among researchers. Bingham (1997) — “Employment Arbitration: The Repeat Player Effect,” Employee Rights and Employment Policy Journal: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1324411 • Colvin (2011) — “An Empirical Study of Employment Arbitration: Case Outcomes and Processes,” Journal of Empirical Legal Studies: https://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/articles/577 (DOI: 10.1111/j.1740-1461.2010.01200.x) • Talesh & Alter — “The Devil Is in the Details: How Arbitration System Design and Training Facilitate and Inhibit Repeat Player Advantages”: https://www.researchgate.net/publication/228160017_Employment_Arbitration_The_Repeat_Player_Effect • Chandrasekher (2019) — critical re-examination of the repeat-player literature, Columbia Law & Economics: https://law-economic-studies.law.columbia.edu/sites/law-economic-studies.law.columbia.edu/files/content/docs/Chandrasekher_Arbitration_10_22_19.pdf • “The Suspicious Existence of the ‘Repeat Player Effect’” — National Law Review: https://natlawreview.com/article/suspicious-existence-repeat-player-effect-mandatory-arbitration-employment-disputes • Wikipedia summary page (good overview with further citations): https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Repeat-player_effect • Harvard Law Systemic Justice Project — “Clauses and Consent: How Forced Arbitration Quietly Took Over Everything”: https://systemicjustice.org/article/clauses-and-consent-how-forced-arbitration-quietly-took-over-everything/