Post #4047337
2026-07-23 22:03 UTC
@Li@tech.lgbt @corbet@social.kernel.org Not of the same type used in laptops and desktops, but the foundational technology is pretty close. Most of the data on your phone still lives in a chip that can be seperated and read.
I did a quick search to verify what I know, and while chip extraction is one of the most risky methods, there are also methods which utilize access to the bootloader (which would be unlocked in any pixel with graphine, because that's how graphine got on there in the first place). Once a cop has boot, they can absolutely make a bitwise copy.
There are other, more invasive methods as well, but the important part is that entering the user's passcode before to back up the phone using any of the specialized tools to do just that is a MASSIVE error that shouldn't just be happening, and indicates a process failure. Especially when you recognize that cops need access to the bitwise copy to check for things like deleted messages.
Replies (1)
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@Li@tech.lgbt 2026-07-23 22:08
@Epic_Null@infosec.exchange @corbet@social.kernel.org sigh and this is why i should be the root of trust on my own fucking devices- so the cops can just not have my private key, and cant get shit, but wait, you could store part of the key in a hardware crypto engine; and then the durress code could still wipe this, making any copy made afterwards useless; (basically, it could be like, .. key = bigmac_encrypt(sha256(user_pass)) .. or something; and then -- this wouldn't work. :akko_shrug: