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@greyarea@mitra.vpclmulqdq.moe

Post #4033228

2026-07-22 17:42 UTC

@silverpill@mitra.social Of an envelope. If actor being changed mid-transit isn't a problem, then omit it from the aad. Including the from/to as part of the AAD binds the ciphertext to the origin/recipient (the HPKE ciphertext does not carry any of this information). It is worth noting that, as the FEP is specified now, using the sender and recipient's keypairs to do HPKE will result in the same shared secret being generated for every message. This is catastrophic to security as the nonce for the symmetric portion of the HPKE encryption is deterministic (RFC 9180 5.1). This can be avoided by either: having the sender generate an ephemeral keypair (include the public key envelope), or using a unique HPKE info per envelope. The former is better as it gives imperfect forward secrecy (sender identity key compromise does not reveal past plaintexts), the latter is cheaper to do.

Replies (1)

  • @silverpill@mitra.social 2026-07-22 21:06

    @greyarea@mitra.vpclmulqdq.moe having the sender generate an ephemeral keypair (include the public key envelope) So the recipient will need to encrypt to this ephemeral key when replying?

    Open ##4033227