Post #3041988
2025-09-09 19:31 UTC
/4 and, best of all, these same properties work identically to mitigate arb offset OOB Spectre v1 gadgets in a way which is performant enough to ship in a consumer product. This lets us defend MTE tags in the kernel against Spectre V1 by forcing attackers to deal with type isolation in order to leak the tags they need to further their memory corruption related attacks.
Replies (2)
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@b3ll@mastodon.social 2025-09-09 19:42
@ezhes_@mastodon.online really really nice work
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@jbowen@mast.hpc.social 2025-09-09 21:17
@ezhes_@mastodon.online I'm not a fan of Apple on FLOSS grounds, but this is really interesting work!