2026-08-07 09:26 UTC
@heiglandreas@phpc.social @kleisli@mastodon.social @naderman@phpc.social @OndrejMirtes@phpc.social @markusstaab@phpc.social @toflar@phpc.social
Long-lived secrets are a liability.
In particular both a PGP signature created with a key stored your CI/CD runner and a PGP signature created with a key on your local machine that was hit by the latest hijacked npm / Composer / Cargo / … package is strictly worse than a SLSA build provenance attestation stored in a transparency log.
Replies (1)
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@timwolla@phpc.social 2026-08-07 09:30
@heiglandreas@phpc.social @kleisli@mastodon.social @naderman@phpc.social @OndrejMirtes@phpc.social @markusstaab@phpc.social @toflar@phpc.social And not to throw shade on them, since they already do SLSA attestations (https://github.com/PHPCSStandards/PHP_CodeSniffer/attestations), but I quite enjoyed that @phpcs@phpc.social apparently rotated their PGP key for their 4.0.2 security release: https://github.com/PHPCSStandards/PHP_CodeSniffer/releases/tag/4.0.2 > The GPG signature for the PHAR files has been rotated. The new fingerprint is: 5CB4F778BF9BC4FB67AE511D96E91A992CF22FF4.