Post #2227243
2025-10-07 08:56 UTC
Replies (7)
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@jmaris@eupolicy.social 2025-10-07 08:57
The whitepaper highlights the technical challenges of detection, how easily it can be bypassed, and the potential to create enormous numbers of false positives, which will actually impede the work of law enforcement in finding and detaining abusers.
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@securedllama@infosec.exchange 2025-10-07 11:36
@jmaris@eupolicy.social saved for when I can read on a full size screen. Thanks!
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@crlamke@mastodon.social 2025-10-07 12:52
@jmaris@eupolicy.social Thank you for sharing this. I found it well-written and accessible.
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@Laurenz0071@mastodon.social 2025-10-07 13:26
@jmaris@eupolicy.social https://fair.tube/w/72DCPMByyS1hoSg7gQFHXw Here a good video explanation of the Max Plank Institute on how the technology of Chat Control works and what this would mean for digital communication within Europe.
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@themipper@mastodon.social 2025-10-07 13:37
@jmaris@eupolicy.social thank you for sharing your analysis!
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@edavies@functional.cafe 2025-10-07 13:45
@jmaris@eupolicy.social Good stuff. But it does rather accept the framing of those behind #ChatControl. Even if CC worked perfectly for its (asserted to be) intended purpose it is still deeply flawed: 1) It places a requirement on people who have no interest in the targetted material to, essentially, prove their innocence. 2) It places restrictions on new communications methods, likely entrenching the domination of the current duopolists (Google and Apple). E.g., who pays to port their scanner to competing minor players such as the various Linux-based mobile OSs? 3) It requires significant processing power on all communicating devices restricting the access of low-power devices to human-to-human communication networks (e.g., home automation bots sending alert messages to their owners). 4) It would allow an unhinged government to scan for political material outside the original intended purpose, e.g., for memes involving recently shot minor celebrities or protest groups which have been, for whatever reason, classified as terrorist. Taking the discussion at the level you accept, there's also the likelihood that those wishing to transmit material the system is intended to catch will simply encrypt it before putting it in the communications app.
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@kallemp@cr8r.gg 2025-10-08 11:56
@jmaris@eupolicy.social Your report is a breath of fresh air and I see no errors in it. The reason it is ignored is that the goal of government is not to protect kids, it has two unstated goals. First the primary goal of government everywhere is to gain more power and the easiest source is from the citizens, to this end ever increasing control measures are always a good thing and any excuse that can be used will be used. Think-about-the-children (tm) is very popular. Second more tragic reason that kids will not be protected is that the threat of exposure of people in leading positions for their deep seated or opportunistic abuse of children is currency to the globalist shadow rulers. They need to have the threat of exposure of secrets that have been discovered by scanning or created by invitations to Epstein Island or Diddys' Rooms to maintain the blackmail program in place. We see this clearly, children are exploited and when an opportunity comes to expose this every effort is made to threaten exposure to keep those blackmailed in line but the exposure is never made on a large scale as this would neutralise the value of the secret material. I still think your report should be much more widely distributed because the total technical failure shows that people who know better DO NOT CARE that it cannot work but want the legislation in place for other reasons.