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2026-10-29 09:16 UTC

---------------- 🎯 Exploit Research =================== Orange Tsai of DEVCORE presented a full exploit chain against Microsoft Edge at Pwn2Own Berlin 2026, built from logic bugs only with no memory corruption. The result earned $175,000 and 17.5 Master of Pwn points, and a ZDI post quoted in the write-up confirms the sandbox escape via four chained logic bugs. According to the author, the complete chain consists of five bugs plus two Windows features. The full hunting process was presented at HITCON and Hexacon, and the work later won the Pwnie Awards' Epic Achievement category. Context: the chain starts in a component most Chromium review efforts treat as quiet territory: Navigation Throttles. These components run in the browser process and intercept navigation requests initiated by either the browser or the renderer. Per the author's survey, fewer than 20 of the 3,000+ CVEs Google Chrome fixed over the past five years relate to Navigation Throttles. Low bug density in a core navigation path suggests the area has seen limited research attention. The entry bug: Edge ships a throttle named EdgeCAGuidanceNavigationThrottle, an Edge-specific component supporting the Conditional Access feature on Entra ID. Its legitimate purpose is guiding users to the correct User Profile when Edge detects a sign-in with a work account on a Microsoft website. Two conditions gate it: • The navigation must start from a Microsoft-owned origin, for example login.live.com. • The target URL must match an internal format: location.href = https://guidance-ca-error/?email={email}&switch_profile={url}` On a format match, the throttle cancels the original navigation and compares the current User Profile email with the email parameter. On mismatch, Edge shows a dialog steering the user toward the right profile. On match, Edge extracts switch_profile from the attacker-controlled query string and launches a new navigation through Chromium's internal Navigation API: NavigateParams params(browser, switch_profile_url, ui::PAGE_TRANSITION_LINK); params.disposition = WindowOpenDisposition::CURRENT_TAB; params.window_action = NavigateParams::SHOW_WINDOW; Navigate(&params); Why it matters: the replacement navigation is initiated by the browser process rather than the renderer. Per the write-up, that makes destinations reachable that are normally blocked: internal pages such as edge://settings, devtools://, and the javascript: pseudo-scheme, for example javascript:alert(origin)`. The author states one limit plainly: firing the throttle requires an execution context on login.live.com, so the javascript: primitive still needs a foothold inside that origin. The retrieved text does not describe how the remaining bugs provide that foothold. Chain composition and open questions: the write-up documents the entry mechanism in depth. The remaining bugs (three of the four used in the sandbox escape, plus the second Windows feature) are covered in the HITCON and Hexacon slides rather than in the article text. No CVE identifiers appear in the post and patch status is not stated. Treat the reported numbers as researcher claims; the quoted ZDI tweet corroborates the Pwn2Own outcome and the bounty. Takeaway: enterprise-specific code paths in Chromium forks sit outside upstream review, and a low-CVE-density area like Navigation Throttles turned out to contain a browser-process navigation primitive. That is a useful data point for anyone mapping browser attack surface in Edge deployments. 🔹 Pwn2Own #MicrosoftEdge #DEVCORE #Chromium #PwnieAwards 🔗 Source: https://blog.orange.tw/posts/2026-10-the-last-proof-of-human-craft-browser-full-chain/

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