Post #1953543

2026-03-27 18:53 UTC

@cas people currently right now inject vulnerabilities into our shared source code by doing exactly as you describe and describing it as intentional. about 6 commits by red hat / IBM engineer david howells in linux-crypto were live on his linux-fs fork from friday to late sunday, before he reset and force pushed. linus agreed with include/crypto/public_key.h turning digest_size -> m_size. he was able to hide these commits not through "AI" (arguably it wasn't hidden at all) but at each point relying upon the right people to not say a thing. i throughout monday and tuesday i recorded ingo molnar adding a make syncconfig that weaponizes the howells config. i guess it makes sense that PREEMPT_RT was actually a fiction—it makes more sense than a monolithic kernel doing anything by half

Replies (1)

@hipsterelectron@circumstances.run 2026-03-27 18:54

@cas i that you can quickly determine if I am wasting your time: if you have a local checkout, the following abbreviated refs modify what I believe to be precisely an area coreutils builds using the --with-linux-crypto configure script would subsequently become affected by. These are from two engineers, one David Howells from Red Hat / IBM, and Eric Biggers of Google. 965e9a2cf23b066d8bdeb690dff9cd7089c5f667 pkcs7: Change a pr_warn() to pr_warn_once() 91db696adea4d76017b1e1f45915a5cbf04e8da3 pkcs7: Allow authenticatedAttributes for ML-DSA 0ad9a71933e73c8a2af101d28e9a1dc35bae02d5 modsign: Enable ML-DSA module signing 8bbdeb7a25b4cd3d829136a2e12982b8ee7d7991 pkcs7, x509: Add ML-DSA support f3eccecd782dbaf33d5ad0d1fd22ea277300acdb pkcs7: Allow the signing algo to do whatever digestion it wants itself f728074f1f577565c97e465652c3d4afb0964013 pkcs7, x509: Rename ->digest to ->m 2c62068ac86bdd917a12eef49ba82ec8b091208b x509: Separately calculate sha256 for blacklist fbfeca74043777b48add294089cd4c4f68ed3377 lib/crypto: aes: Drop 'volatile' from aes_sbox and aes_inv_sbox 9ddfabcc1ed884ef47bcca317e77596c797bef83 lib/crypto: sha1: Remove low-level functions from API 5023479627e3e85a97807f612bea2eddbf202e1d ipv6: Switch to higher-level SHA-1 functions 20d6f07004d639967dcb00994d56ce6d16118e9e lib/crypto: tests: Add a .kunitconfig file 4478e8eeb87120c11e90041864c2233238b2155a lib/crypto: tests: Depend on library options rather than selecting them beeebffc807531f69445356180238500f56951cc lib/crypto: powerpc/aes: Fix rndkey_from_vsx() on big endian CPUs ffd42b6d0420c4be97cc28fd1bb5f4c29e286e98 lib/crypto: mldsa: Clarify the documentation for mldsa_verify() slightly This is my checkout of Linus's checkout: https://codeberg.org/cosmicexplorer/linux/src/branch/master This is Linus's checkout: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/ c369299895a591d96745d6492d4888259b004a9e In particular, there was: ML-DSA module signing added with this openly broken config section:config PKCS7_WAIVE_AUTHATTRS_REJECTION_FOR_MLDSA bool "Waive rejection of authenticatedAttributes for ML-DSA" depends on PKCS7_MESSAGE_PARSER depends on CRYPTO_MLDSA help Due to use of CMS_NOATTR with ML-DSA not being supported in OpenSSL < 4.0 (and thus any released version), enabling this allows authenticatedAttributes to be used with ML-DSA for module signing. Use of authenticatedAttributes in this context is normally rejected. wide-ranging changes to cryptographic APIs (I was under the impression include/crypto/public_key.h is shared with dependents such as coreutils) finally, there is this new directory scripts/livepatch, with two files of significance: fix-patch-lines, which pretty openly states that its goal is to create patch files that work after nontrivial modifications klp-build, which will modify and update the kernel configuration so that it the above is not exposed.

Open ##1953544