Post #1669962
2026-04-21 11:31 UTC
@civodul @luj @zimoun I skimmed through the paper but I did not find what I was interested in. How do you address the committer trust layer? I get that Guix authenticates Git checkouts and verifies signatures of committers.
How does Guix work towards coercion resistance against backdooring, suspicious behavioral attacks, compromised forge accounts/authoring systems, etc. ?
I suspect this is the point that has been the least addressed among all modern supply chain solutions.
Replies (2)
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@zimoun@social.sciences.re 2026-04-21 12:13
@raito I agree. This is what I’ve tried to express with the second point: « Guix is like the indian Dabbawala service using “barecodes” everywhere. It doesn’t prevent stories as The Lunchbox. » 😁 Yeah, “shit in, shit out”. Somehow, the “shit” cannot be compromised by the supply chain and if any it’s detectable. However being detectable often produces the false feeling of protecting against “shit out”. 🫣 @luj @civodul
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@civodul@toot.aquilenet.fr 2026-04-21 14:30
@raito Compromised forges are not a problem: one needs access to a committer’s key to get code in Guix. Coercion? The only way I can think of to mitigate this is canaries. But this is hard to counter by definition, and I’d say beyond our threat model (for now). @zimoun @luj