Post #1528781
2026-04-16 10:59 UTC
Assuming the technical implementation is sound (I'm techy but that's still way over my head), there is something missing from the explanations I've been seeing so far.
The state is of course the one who should be proving my identity, and the website has (usually) no business knowing who I am or holding a copy of my documents. The state however has no business knowing what I'm browsing, and a pinky promise is not enough.
I can't understand whether this is something that the proposed system offers, or whether it's a property of zero-proof systems in general.
Obviously something like this must necessarily be Free and Open Source if any trust at all must be put into it.
Replies (1)
-
@FineCoatMummy@sh.itjust.works 2026-04-16 15:15
> and a pinky promise is not enough. Yah that's my sticking point too! I believe that under good faith, Zero Knowledge Proof could work and guard privacy from both the gov and the sites. But "good faith" is doing heavy lifting. The desire to corrupt the system in some way that turns ZKP into secretly **non**-ZKP is going to be huge. Even if it begins OK, we will all become locked into it. And if it gets corrupted years later, too bad so sad, because we're locked into it! We've already seen intelligence agencies trying to corrupt encryption standards, to look secure when they have a secret flaw. That's the kind of corruption I worry about with ZKP age gates.